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Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. Pres1ctent, how
goes the time?
The PRESIDING OFFICER The
Senator from Montana has 6 minutes
remaining and the Senator from Pennsylvania has 3 minutes remaining.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I
yield myself as much time as I may require within the 6 minutes.
Mr. Pres,ident, so far as I am aware,
not a Member of this body, to my knowledge, has spoken during this floor debate
against extending the voting franchise to
those 18 and above. There is a great deal
of concern about the proper way to
achieve this objective. Some persons
think, very honestly, that the only way
is through the constitutional process.
Others think It is by statute.
There has been a lot of talk this morning about the Randolph constitutional
amendment resolution, with 74 or 75
signatures, which now resides within the
confines of the Judiciary Committee.
There has been some talk, encouraging at
least on the surface, that If we do not
do anything about this, or let it slide
by, it will not be long before the Randolph resolution will be reported out of
the Judiciary Committee.
Frankly, I doubt that It will be reported
shortly, under the very best of circwnstances. Frankly, I know, as far as the
House Judiciary Committee is concerned,
no action will be taken this year, any
more than was taken in previous years.
So what we are going to do if we do
not face up to this issue on this basis, not
only for this year but perhaps for years
to come, Is forgo the possibility of a constitutional amendment which will put
into effeCt what every Member of this
body desires, at least as far as I am
aware-Mr. AIKEN. Mr. President, will the
Senator yield?
Mr. MANSFIELD. I yield.
Mr. AlKEN. I wonder if perhaps the
Senator feels that if the amendment is
defeated today the defeat will be taken
as the sentiment of this body, and perhaps the constitutional amendment proposal wlll never come out of the Judiciary Committee at all, since the Interpretation will be that the Senate has
already voted against it, and so why
bother?
Mr. MANSFIELD. That Is correct. It is
a good burial grow1d for certain types of
legislation, and I do not think we ought
to try to blink away the facts.
What we have now is the first chance
and the only chance that I can recall, on
a national scale, tor this Institution to
face up to this Issue squarely.
This amendment would extend the
right to vote to every citizen of the
United States who Is 18 years old and
older. It would afford that right In every
election, Federal, State, or local.
Much has been said lately about extending the franchise by statute. It Is
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argued by those that oppose this method
that Congress does not have the power
to act; only the Supreme Court ca.n make
those fine constitutional distinctions.
The Supreme Court is the final arbiter
of these questions, but it Is about time
that Congress assumed its responsib111t1es
as well.
In an effort to determine the limits·
of Congress' constitutional authority,
I sent a telegram to Prof. Paul Freund,
probably the best constitutional lawyer
in this country. In addition, I looked up
the testimony of the former Solicitor
General of the United States, Archibald
Cox, talked to other people, and have
received information which, to my way
of thlnld.ng, 118 e. nonlawyer, validates
the procedure which we are following
and does insure a possible way by means
of which the 18-yee.r-olds and above can
achieve the right to vote.
At 18, 19, and 20, young people are in
the forefront of the political processworking, listening, talking, participating.
They are barred from voting.
I do not think they do enough talking.
I do not think they do enough 1nflltre.ting into the established political
parties. I think tnoae af us above the age
of 30 could stand a Uttle educating from
these youngsters-not the minuscule minority that always gets the publlcity, but
the conscientious, idealistic majority of
young men and. women who could bring
our parties some new blood, some new
vigor, aome new ideas. Both parties could
stand a pretty strong transfusion.
Mr. HOLLAND. Mr. President, wUl the
Senator yield?
Mr. MANSFIELD. If I may finish, first.
I am on a tight schedule here.
TheY will not only bring us a fresh
outlook, but will bring ws their innovation, and will do what they can through
acts of participation, to become a part
of the whole, rather than on the outside,
as is the case at the present tlme.
They fight our wars. You can brush
aside that argument all you want, but
that is a most important argument, and
I think these youngsters who are called
because of our responsibility, because we
have laid down the policy, should have
a right, at least in some small part, to
influence -the setting of that policy.
They are eligible to be treated 118 adults
in the courts, in both civil and criminal
actions. They marry at 18. They have
children. They pay taxes. The hold
down full-time Jobs.
So I would hope that the Senate would
approve the ballot for the 18-year-olds
at this time, in this fashion, and on this,
the voting measure to which it is germane. As a political forecaster, I possess
no extraordinary capacities. But I am
aware of the public reports by some in
opposition to the extension of voting
rights-by any method-to 18-year-olds.
I know that some who have spoken out
are in a position to thwart the efforts of
the congressional proponents of this proposal. So this amendment on this bill
will be, in my opinion, the only chance
the Congress will have of enacting this
proposal. Either it becomes law on this
bill, or it is dead for this Congress.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator's time has expired.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask slons "by appropriate legislation," was reunanimous consent to have printed in garded as the cutting edge of the Amendwas expected that Congress would
the RECORD with my remarks a letter ment. Itthe
substantive content tor the dewhich I received from Prof. Paul A. supply
liberately general standards of equal proFreund of Stanford University under tection, due process, and privileges and Imdate of March 5, 1970.
munities.
There being no objection, the letter
Recent decisions have emphasized the prowas ordered to be printed in the RECORD, priety, Indeed the responsibility, o! Congressional
action In the area o! voting rights. 1n
as follows:
CENTER J'OR ADVANCED STUDY IN
THE BEHAVIORAL SciENCES,
Stanford, Calif., March 5, 1970.

Hon. MicHAEL J. MANSJ'IELD,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR MANSFIELD: I greatly ap•
preclate your telegram Inviting me to elabore.te on the opinion which I expressed In
an a.ddress In June 1968, that Congress might,
by statute, lower the voting age tor state
and Federal elections to the age of eighteen.
The COnstitution of 1787 left the question
ot suffrage basically to the several states. In
Article I, section 2, It Is provided that the
el.ectors In each state for the House of Representatives "shaJJ have the quallt!catlons
requisite tor electors of the most numerous
branch of the state legislature." Article I,
section 4, provides that the times, piaces and
manner or holding elections !or Senators and
Representatives shall be prescribed In each
state. Congress Is given the power by Jaw
to make or alter such regulations. My opinIon does not at all rest on the last clause
Although "manner" has been given a generous construction to Include, tor example,
Federal corrupt practices Jaws applicable to
national elections, the specific provl.alon on
"quallficatlons" In the ee.rller section would
rule out any effort to absorb the requirement or a minimum age tor voting Into the
"manner" of holding such elections. And so
If the text of 1787 stood alone there would
appear to be no basis for the legislative
proposal.
But that original text does not stand alone.
The Fourteenth Amendment, with Its
guare.ntee of equal protection of the laws (no
Jess than the Fifteenth, prohibiting specifically disqualifications based ·on race or
color) Introduced a vital gloss on the authority of the states, namely that unreasonable classifications by Jaw are unacceptable.
This general standard applles to the Jaws of
sultrage no less than to other Jaws, despite
the fact that racial dlsqua!l.ftcatlons are
treated sp<!KllficaJJy In the Fifteenth Amendment. It Is much too late to question this
force of the Fourteenth Amendment In this
area. Indeed, the first of the so-caJJed white
primary C8.8es W8.8 decided on the baala of
the Fourteenth rather than the Fifteenth.
As Justice Reed later pointed out, "Without
consideration of the Fifteenth, this Court
held that the action of Texas In denying the
ballot to Negroes by statute was In violation
of the equal protection clause or 'the Fourteenth Amendment,'' Smith v. Allwright, 321
U.S. 649, 6118 (1944), referring to Nixon v.
Herndcm, 273 U.S. 536 (1927). The Whole llne
of reapportionment cases rests on the applicability of the equal-protection guarantee to
the suttrage; and surely rellglous q uallficatlons, Which are Impermissible tor omceholdlng, would be equally !orpldden tor votlnwln light of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The essentla:l question, then, Is whether
Congress, In Its power and responsibility to
enforce the guarantees of the F ourteenth
Amendment, may properly conclude that the
exclusion from the suffrage of those between
18 and 21 years of age now constitutes an
unreasonable discrimination. That this Is a
judgment for the CongreBB to make Is plain
from the original conception of the Fourteenth Amendment and from recent decisions under it. Section 5 of that Amendment.
empowering Congress to enforce Its provl-

1965 , as you know, Congress enacted a provision of the Voting Rights Act that overrode
state requirements of literacy In English,
where a person had received a sixth-grade
education In another language In a school
under the American flag. It was argued, In
contesting the Federal law, that Congress
could so provide only If the Engllsh-llteracy
reqUirement were regarded by the Court Itself as In violation of the equal-protection
guaranty of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Upholding the Federal law, the Supreme
Court emphasized that the judgment of unreasonable discrimination was one tha.t Congress bad appropriately made for ltsel!, and
that Its judgment would be upheld unless
It were Itself an unreasonable one. Any other view of the Court's function, said the
Court. "would depreciate both Congressional
resourcefulness and Congressional responslblllty for Implementing the Amendment.
It would confine the legislative power In
this context to the lnslgnlftcant role elf
abrogatlhg only those state laws that the
judicial bre.nch wu prepared to a.djudge
unconstitutional, or of merely Informing the
judgment of the Judiciary by particularizing
the 'majestic generalities' of section 1 of the
Amendment." "[I] Is enough," the Court
added, "that we perceive a basis upon which
Congress might predicate a judgment that
the application or New York's li te acy requirement ... constituted an Invidious discrimination In violation of the Equal Protection Olause." Katzen.bach v. Morgan, 384

u.s.

641, 648-649 (1966).

The Supreme Court bas held, In & six-tothree decision, that the poll tax as a condition of voting In state elections Is unconstltuJtlonaJ even without a Congressional
judgment on the matter. Harper v. VIrginia
Board of Elections, 388 U.S . 6"3 (1966).
Whether or not one agrees with that decision,
tor present purposes the case has a twofold
significance. The first relates to the dissentIng opinions. Justice Black, protesting
against the "activism" o! the majority (as
others have termed It) , went on to say, " I
have no doubt at all that COngreBB bas the
power under section 5 to p8.88 legislation to
abolish the poll tax In order to protect the
citizens or this country If It believes that
the poll tax Is being used as a device to deny
voters the equal protection of the Jaws . . .
But this legislative power which was granted
to Congress by section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment Is lmlte<l to Congress .. . For
Congress to do this ftts In precisely with the
division of powers originally entrusted to the
three branches of government--Executl ve,
Legislative, and Judicial." ld. at 679-680.
The other dl.ssenters, Justices Harlan and
Stewart, referred to the possible authority of
Congress and said that they "Intimate no
view on that question." Id. at 680, n . 2. Thus
It Is entirely possible that ha.d Congress ltselt
acted, the decision might have been unanlmo.us.
The second point or slgnlftcance In the
poll-tax case Is the bearing o! the constitutional amending power. There was then In
effect, of course, the Twenty-Fourth Amendment, abolishing poll taxes In relation to
Federal elections. Both the majority and
mlnorlt:t opinions show that Congressional
authority Is not precluded because t he subject might be committed, Indeed had been
cornmlt'ted, to the amending process.
It could be asked whether, on the ba.s'
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o! the views reft&eted here. lt was actually
necessary to have achieved wom6n suffrage
through a constitutional amendment. At the
time of the Nineteenth Amendment the
power o! Congress to enforce the equalprotection guaranty was In a. dormant state.
The alternatives were thought of a.e a judicial decision striking down exclusively male
suffrage, or a.n amendment to the Constitution. In retrospect . 1t seems tolerably clear
that from the standpoint of constitutional
power (putting a.slde considerations of politIcal expediency), Congress could have determined by law that exclusion from voting on
the basis of sex wa.s an u nwarranted differentiation .
The question !or Congress Is essentially
the same, whether the exclusion be on criteria. of sex, residence, literacy, or age. It Is
not my purpose to review the considerations
that have been brought forward In favor of
reducing the voting age. They Involve a judgment whether twenty-one has become an
unreasonable line o! demarcation In light of
the level of education attalne<l by younger
persons, their Involvement In political discussion, their capacity In many cases to
marry, their criminal responsibility, their
obligation tor compulsory mll1ta.ry service.
Historically, we are told, twenty-one was
fixe<! e.s the age of majority because a young
man was deemed to have become capable at
that age of bearing the hea vy armor of a
knight.
The cummula.tlve effect of such considerations on the continued reasonableness of
twenty-one as a. minimum voting will, I am
sure, be canvassed by the Congress. My purpose, responsive to your Invitation, has been
to Indicate why I believe that Congress may
properly make such a judgment and embody
It In the form of a. statute.
Yours very sincerely,
PAUL A. FREUND,
Professor, Harvard Law School .
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